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Intention in criminal law:
why is it so difficult to find?
Simon Parsonsl
In Woollin' the House of Lords attempted to clarifY the law of
indirect intent by holding that if a consequence is a virtually certain result
of an act and the actor foresaw it as such then that result may be found
by a jury to be intended, even though it was not the actor's purpose to
cause it. This article will examine the case law leading to Woollin and
consider whether the House was right to leave a question of law (the
meaning of intention) to be decided by ajury as an issue offact.
What is the meaning of intention in criminal law?
There is one meaning of intention that is agreed upon and that is
where a defendant wants something to happen as a result of his
conduct. For example, the defendant wants to kill the victim and to do
so he puts a gun to the victim's head and pulls the trigger. This is
known as direct intent as it is the defendant's purpose to kill the victim.
In such cases, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the defendant wanted, when he pulled the trigger, to kill the victim, ie he
had malice aforethought-an intention to kill the victim.3 The
prosecution will do this by calling evidence, for example, a witness
testifies that he saw the defendant put the gun to the victim's head and
pull the trigger. This is direct evidence that the defendant killed the
victim and circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to kill:
It is immaterial that the chances of the result occurring were low, for
example, the defendant was half a mile away from the victim when he
Senior Lecturer, Southampton Institute.
[1998] 4 All ER 103.
Malice aforethought is also present if the defendant has an intention to cause grevious
bodily harm. Cunningham [1982] AC 566.
See Smith JC, Criminal Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995 p 5.
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fired the gun. The defendant still intended to kill because that is what he
wanted to do.5 In such cases a judge should refrain from giving a jury
guidance as what intention means,6 other than to tell them, it is a
question of fact for the jury to decide whether a defendant intended a
result," and in doing so they must use their common sense based on all
the relevant circumstances given in evidence.
In addition to this meaning of intention based on purpose or desire,
the courts have put forward a second meaning to intention where the
actor's purpose is not to cause a result, but he realises that by his act
that result is very likely. This is because a single act can have two quite
separate outcomes, for example, the actor insures the cargo on an
areoplane and places a bomb on it timed to go off when the plane is in
flight. The actor's purpose is to claim the insurance money but he
foresees it as very likely that aircrew will be killed. In this example, a
distinction can be made between his direct intent to claim the insurance
money, and his indirect (or oblique) intent (based on foresight) to kill the
aircrew. The question the courts have struggled with is whether such
an actor is guilty ofmurder.
One possible starting point of an examination of the decisions that
attempt to deal with the problem of indirect intent is the House of Lords
decision in Hyam v DPP.8 In Hyam, Mrs Hyam's lover, a Mr Jones,
discarded her in favour of a Mrs Booth. Mrs Hyam's reaction was to
pour petrol through the letterbox of her rival's house which she ignited
by using a newspaper and a match. Two'ofMrs Booth's children died
as the result of asphyxia caused by the fumes generated by the fire.
Mrs Hyam maintained that she had not wanted to kill anyone, but rather
that she merely wanted to frighten her rival away from Jones. The
House, by a majority of three to two, upheld Mrs Hyam's conviction for
murder. Lord Diplock stated:
A defendant can only intend a result if he believes it is achievable. However the
prosecution could point out that if the result is objectively po~sible then it is very
likely that the defendant intended it.
Fallon [1994] CrimLR519; Smith [1998] CrimLR896.
Section 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967.
[1974] 2 All ER 41.
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'[N]o distinction is to be drawn in English law between the state
of mind ofone who does an act because he desires it to produce a
particular evil consequence, and the state of mind of one who
does the act knowing full well that it is likely to produce that
consequence although it may not be the object he was seeking to
achieve by doing the act. '9
In Lemon'o Lord Diplock further stated
'It is by now well-settled law that both states of mind constitute
"intention" in the sense in which that expression is used in the
definition ofa crime whether at common law or in a statute. Any
doubts on this matter were finally laid to rest by the decision of
this House in Regina v Hyam [1975] AC 55."1
This means intention is present, first where an actor wants or
desires a consequence to occur-it is the purpose of his action and,
second, where a result is not wanted or desired but the actor does the
act 'knowing full well' that the consequence is 'likely', ie foresight of a
highly probable consequence can amount to intention.
In the nineteen eighties there were three further decisions of
House of Lords in which the House was again faced with murder and
the problem of defining intention. In Moloneyl2 there had been a family
party at which the appellant and his stepfather were present. Both had
been drinking heavily and when the other members of the family had
gone to bed, they participated in a gun loading contest which the
appellant won. The stepfather then challenged the appellant to pull the
trigger which he did, killing the stepfather. The appellant said 'I didn't
ibid at p 63.
10
II
12
[1979] AC 617.
ibid at p 638. Contrast Smith JC, "A majority of the House in Hyam was certainly of
the opinion that this was the law but the actual decision was that foresight of high
probability of serious harm was a sufficient mens rea for murder, not that such a state
of mind necessarily amounted to an intention to cause serious bodily harm"
Smith&Hogan Criminal Law (9th ed) p 54.
[1985] I All ER 1025.
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want to kill him. It was kill or be killed. I loved him, I adored him.'13
In Hancock and Shankland'4 two striking miners, Hancock and
Shankland, dropped a concrete block and a concrete post from a
motorway bridge killing a taxi driver who was taking a working miner to
work. The appellants maintained they had no intention to kill or to inflict
harm of any kind, but rather their intention was to frighten the working
miner into stopping work. The trial judges in both cases directed the jury
in terms of the second meaning of intention given in Hyam and in both
the jury convicted of murder. In Moloney the House quashed the
conviction for murder substituting one of manslaughter instead, whilst in
Hancock and Shankland the House dismissed the Crown's appeal,
confirming the Court of Appeal's decision to quash the murder
conviction and to substitute one of manslaughter.
In Moloney Lord Bridge stated:
'I am fnmly of [the] opinion that forsight of consequences, as an
element bearing on the issue of intention in murder, or indeed any
other crime of specific intent, belongs not to the substantive law
but to the law of evidence. '15
It can be argued that if a person foresees a consequence, that is
sufficient evidence that that consequence is wanted or desired. But
Lord Bridge appeared to rule this out when he stated, with reference to
indirect intent, that 'intention is something quite distinct from motive or
desire. '16 Lord Bridge's reasoning (which was supported in Hancock
and Shankland) accepts the first meaning of intention - purpose, but
does not accept the second meaning, given in Hyam, ie foresight of a
highly probable consequence. Rather foresight is merely evidence from
which intention can be inferred by a jury. The problem is that when a
jury so inferred intention it had no meaning as Lord Bridge rules out
purpose.
13
14
15
16
ibid at p 1028.
[1986] I All ER 641.
n12atp1038.
n12atp1037.
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This leads to the question as to when can a jruy infer intention
from foresight? In Moloney Lord Bridge stated in the rare cases when
a jruy has to be directed in terms of forsight of consequences it should
be invited to consider two questions:
'First, was death or really serious injruy in a murder case (or
whatever relevant consequence must be proved to have been
intended in any other case) a natural consequence of the
defendant's voluntary act? Second, did the defendant foresee that
consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury
should then be told that if they answer Yes to both questions it is a
proper inference for them to draw that he intended that
consequence. ' 17
However, in Hancock and Shankland this approach was found
to be misleading by Lord Scarman because neither question directly
referred to probability so that a jury would concentrate on the causal link
between the act and its consequence-the unlawful killing of a human
being. This would extend the number of cases in which an inference
could be made, because a result could still be a natural consequence
even though there was a low probability of it occurring. 18 Lord Scarman
went on to say that model directions should be used sparingly and be
limited to cases of real difficulty. 'If it is done, the guidelines should
avoid generalisation so far as is possible and encourage the jury to
exercise their common sense in reaching what is their decision on the
facts. '19
Initially the Court ofAppeal favoured this approach, even in cases
of indirect intent, thus leaving juries to infer intention from foresight
'by considering all the relevant circumstances and in particular what [the
defendant] did and what he said about it.'20 However, in Nedrick21 the
17
18
19
20
21
nl2 at p 1039.
nl4 at p 650.
nl4 at p 651.
Purcell (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 45 at p 48 per Lord Lane.
[1986] 3 All ER I.
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Court of Appeal achnowledged that cases of indirect intent were ones
of real difficulty and returned to a model direction. The facts of
Nedrick were very similar to those of Hyam. The appellant had a
grudge against a woman called Viola Foreshaw, as a result of which,
after threats that he would 'bum her out', he went to her house and
poured paraffin through the letter box and onto the front door and set it
alight. He gave no warning. The house was burnt down and one of
Viola Foreshaw's children died ofasphyxiation and burns. The Court of
Appeal quashed the murder conviction and substituted one of
manslaughter. It is interesting to note that had Nedrick been tried
before the decisions in Moloney and Hancock and Shankland it is
likely that he would have been convicted of murder and therefore he
was temporally fortunate in comparsion to Mrs Hyam. Thus Nedrick
did avoid the label of murderer, although he did receive a fifteen year
prison sentence which is probably what would have been served had
he been convicted of murder. Lord Lane CJ took the opportunity to give
a direction to be used in cases of indirect intent only:"
'Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the
simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they
are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel
sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty
(barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the
defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that such
was the case. '23
This judgment has been very valuable to juries because it gives
clear guidance as to when they can infer intention from foresight. In
particular, foresight of a natural consequence, required in Moloney, is
not enough for there to be an inference of intention. Rather there has to
be foresight of a virtual certainty, which is a much narrower concept.
This limited the overlap with subjective recklessness so that there was a
reduction in the scope of the law of murder. However, the Court of
"
23
n6.
n21 atp4.
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Appeal was bound by the House of Lords decisions, so was unable to
say foresight of a virtual certain result is a second meaning of intention,
although Lord Lane subsequently admitted that he would have liked to
give intention that second meaning.24 Thus it remained the case that
intention, when inferred from foresight of virtual certain result, still had
no meaning.25
It was not until the late nineteen nineties that House of Lords, in
Woollin,26 again considered the law of indirect intent. In Woollin the
appellant lost his temper and threw his three-month son on to a hard
surface. The son sustained a fractured skull and died. The appellant
was charged with murder. The prosecution did not contend that the
appellant desired to kill his son or to cause him serious injury. The issue
was whether the appellant nevertheless had the intention to cause
serious harm. The appellant denied that he had any such intention. The
trial judge had initially given the Nedrick direction but, after an overnight
adjournment, he instead directed the jury in terms of a substantial risk
which is wider than virtual certainty, because an inference of intention
could be inferred from foresight of a lower risk. The appellant was
convicted of murder and his conviction was confirmed by the Court of
Appeal. The House of Lords in an unanimous decision27 quashed the
appellant's conviction and substituted one of manslaughter. Lord Steyn
stated that the decision in Hyam had resulted in the law of murder being
in a state of disarray,28 but later his judgment does partially agree with
24
25
26
27,
28
See Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (9th ed) Smith JC, p 55.
Contrast Clarkson and Keating "Presumably, as foresight of a virtual certainty is not
itself intention, but something from which intention may be inferred, intention, as a
matter of substantive law, must mean direct intention. It is difficult to see what else it
could mean." Clarkson C and Keating H, Criminal Law Text and Materials (4th 00)
p140. See also Halpin AKW, "Intended Consequences and Unintentional Fallacies"
(1987) 7 OJLS 104.
n2.
It mayor may not be significant that Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Hoffmann
"assented" and agreed that the appeal should be allowed but, rather pointedly, did not
express the usual agreement (see Lord Nolan) with Lord Steyn's and Lord Hope's
speeches. One might infer (but not find!) that two of their Lordships were a little
reluctant; so possibly the majority were going as far as was compatible with unanimity-
which is particularly important in the criminal law. But this is speculation' JC Smith
commentary to Woollin [1998] Crim LR 890 at 892.
n2 at p 108.
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Hyam when he states '[t]he effect of the critical [Nedrick] direction is
that a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended result. '29 The
difference is in the degree of foresight. The Nedrick direction is
confirmed as being 'simple and clear '30 and
'I am satisfied that the Nedrick test, which was squarely based
on the decision of the House in R v Moloney, is pitched at the
right level of foresight. It may be appropriate to give a direction in
accordance with R v Nedrick in any case in which the defendant
may not have desired the result of his act. '31
The direction given by the trial judge was a misdirection because
by using the phrase 'substantial risk' it blurred the distinction between
intention and subjective recklessness, 'and hence between murder and
manslaughter. The misdirection enlarged the scope of the mental
element required for murder.'" In confmning the Nedrick direction
Lord Steyn substitutes the word 'find' for 'infer'33 and this has received
academic approval because 'it will and should get away from the
strange and much criticised notion of inferring one state of mind from
another. '34 Thus intention to kill (or to cause grievous bodily harm) now
has two meanings. First, where it is the actor's purpose to kill (or cause
to grevious bodily harm) (direct intent); and second, where the actor's
primary purpose is not to kill (or cause grievous bodily harm) but he
foresees that result as a virtually certain consequence of his act (indirect
intent).
Lord Steyn also states that 'It does not follow that "intent"
necessarily has precisely the same meaning in every context in the
criminal law. The focus of the present appeal is the crime of murder. '35
29
n2 at plIO.
30
n2atpl12.
31
n2atpl12.
32
n2atpl12.
33
n2 at p 113.
34
n27 at p 891.
35
n2 at pp 107-108.
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It is submitted that the above meaning applies all crimes of specific
intent that are result crimes and to the law of attempt.36
Discussion
The first question that needs to be considered is whether all the above
cases involve indirect intent? It is submitted that Moloney and Woollin
were in fact cases of direct intent and to give a direction in terms of
foresight did not enable the jury to ask the right question about the facts
of the case, ie had the prosecution satisfied them, beyond reasonable
doubt,. that the defendant's purpose was to kill or cause grevious bodily
harm when he did the act that caused the actus reus? In Moloney
Lord Bridge acknowledges this:
'[T]he issue for the jury was a short and simple one. If they were
sure that, at the moment of pulling the trigger which discharged
the live cartridge, the appellant realised that the gun was pointing
straight at his stepfather's head, they were bound to convict him
ofmurder. If, on the other hand, they thought it might be true that,
in the appellant's drunken condition and in the context of this
ridiculous challenge, it never entered the appellant's head when he
pulled the trigger that the gun was pointing at his stepfather, he
should be acquitted ofmurder and convicted ofmanslaughter. 'J7
The same reasoning could have been applied to appellant in
Woollin, ie did the appellant have the purpose of killing or causing
grievous bodily harm to his son when he threw him against a hard
surface? As the prosecution did not allege such a purpose the jury, it
must be assumed,38 were prevented from asking that question.
If it is accepted that there are cases of indirect intent and, it is
submitted, there are because in Hyam, Hancock and Shankland and
36
J7
38
This means that the Court of Appeal decision in Walker and Hayles (1990) 90 Cr App
R 226 that foresight of "a very high degree of probability" that death be caused would
be enough for attempted murder is wrong.
nl2 at p 1030.
Research into the deliberation ofjuries has not been allowed.
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Nedrick the appellants' primary purpose was not to kill or cause
grevious bodily harm, but rather to frighten, then a number questions
arise concerning the Nedrick or as it should now be called the Woollin
direction. The fIrst is that it has been argued that '[t]he decision of the
House is important and most welcome in that it draws a fIne line
between intention and recklessness. '39 But if subjective recklessness is
defmed in terms of foresight then foresight of virtually certain result
must encompass recklessness, but a jury is entitled to fInd intention. So
the overlap is still present:o thus it is the degree of foresight that is
important. Accordingly the meaning of 'virtually certain' must be clear
to a jury, they must know that it is different ( a higher level) from
foresight of any degree of probability. Secondly the direction has an
objective element 'unless [the jury] feel sure that death or serious bodily
harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a
result of the defendant's actions' and it has been pointed out that this is
an unnecessary element as '[t]he state of mind of a person who thinks
he knows is the same as as that of a person who actually knows.' 4 1
What should be proved is that the actor foresaw the result as virtually
certain, and the fact it was objectively so, should be merely evidence of
that foresight. As the law presently stands a jury may decide that the
defendant foresaw a result as virtually certain but they will be unable to
fInd intention because they conclude, objectively, that the result was not
virtually certain. This would be a nonsense as intention should have a
subjective meaning whether direct or indirect.
The third issue is the most difficult. Should the law of murder
include cases of indirect intent? The answer seems to depend on
whether the actor's primary purpose or motive is morally wrong or not.
H has been argued that if a jury is satisfIed, for example, that the
defendant foresaw a death as virtually certain (and it was objectively so)
then they must fmd an intention to kill otherwise a question of law will be
left to decided by as an issue of fact. 42 But it has also been pointed out
39
40
41
42
n27 at p 891.
See n24 at pp 56-57 for the argument that in certain circumstances the overlap can be
avoided.
n24 at p 55. See also Textbook on Criminal Law, MJ Allen, (5th ed) p 64.
n24 at p 55. See also Textbook on Criminal Law, MJ Allen, (5th ed) p 64.
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that this would prevent a jury considering a moral dilemma that may
exist in a case of indirect intent, which may lead a jury to conclude that
they are entitled not to find intention.43 There have been cases which
have involved such a dilemma, for example, in Steane44 where the
appellant, a British subject, was employed as a film actor in Germany
and, when war broke out, he was forced to broadcast German radio
propaganda under the threat that ifhe did not do so his wife and children
would be put in a concentration camp. After the war Steane was
convicted ofdoing an act likely to assist the enemy with intent to do so.
The Court ofCriminal Appeal quashed his conviction on the basis that:
'[I]f, on the totality of the evidence, there is room for more than
one view as to the intent of the prisoner, the jury should be
directed that it is for the prosecution to prove the intent of the
prisoner and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they think that
the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the
prisoner is entitled to be acquitted. '45
This judgment recognises there are cases where a jury should
have the discretion to limit the meaning of intent to purpose, because
that would recognise that Steane had a good motive for acting. This is
Norrie's argument '[t]he moral point in Steane was better achieved
through a narrowing of the law of intention by recognising the moral
threshold between the direct intent (saving the family) and the indirect
intent (assisting the enemy).'46 Similarly in Gillick's case,47 where it
was held that a doctor did not intend to encourage a man to have
unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16, and thus was not an
accomplice to that offence, when he gave contraceptive advice to such
a girl because his primary purpose or motive was good, ie he wanted to
protect the girl from an unwanted pregnancy. This reasoning has been
43
44
45
46
47
See Norrie A, "After Woollin", [1999], Crim LR 532.
[1947]IAII ER 813.
ibid at p 816 per Lord Goddard CJ.
n43 at p 538.
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 402.
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criticised because:
'[I]t seems that the concept of intent is strained to do a job for
which it is not fitted. Steane's acquittal would more properly have
been based on duress and the case envisaged by in Gillick seems
to have been, in substance, one ofnecessity. '48
However, in the law of murder the defence of necessity (or
duress of circumstances) is only available to medical doctors where it is
known as the doctrine of double effect. So if a doctor gives his patient
an injection of diamorphine with the primary purpose of relieving the
patient's great pain but realising that it is virtually certain that the
injection will accelerate death, and it does so, then it has been accepted
that the mens rea and actus reus are present but that the doctor has a
defence.49 But the same outcome could be achieved by recognising the
moral dilemma between the doctor's primary purpose or motive of
relieving pain and the foresight ofdeath, so that the meaning of intention
would be limited, in such cases, to purpose. Only doctors who acted with
the purpose of killing would be guilty of murder.50 Such a discretion
should be available to a jury otherwise the criminal law is inconsistent
and unjust because the doctrine of double effect is not available to
nurses or others (such as close relatives) who administer pain-relieving
drugs in such circumstances. Without the discretion they will be guilty
of murder even though there was the same morally good motive.
There are other circumstances where the discretion to consider
the moral dilemma is necessary, for example, in the Herald of Free
Enterprise disaster a man was blocking an escape ladder and refused to
move, thus preventing the escape of others, so he was. pushed off and
drowned." The defence of duress of circumstances does not extend to
48
49
50
"
n24 at p 57. See also Clarkson & Keating, Criminal Law Text and Materials, (4th ed)
Clarkson C and Keating H, p 143.
Arlidge A, The Trial of Dr David Moor, [2000], Crim LR 31; Smith JC, A Comment
on Moor's Case, [2000], Crim LR 41 at 42.
As in Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38 where Dr Cox killed his patient by administering a
lethal dose of potassium chloride, a drug with no pain relieving properties so his
primary purpose was to kill.
See Smith JC, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, 1989, at pp 73-74.
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murder in these circumstances, so if the person who pushed him off had
been charged with murder it is likely he would have been convicted
unless a jury, following the Woollin direction, had exercised its
discretion not to find intention, thus recognising the moral dilemma
between the person's primary purpose of saving others and his foresight
of the man's virtually certain death by drowning.
Conclusion
It is submitted that, by entitling a jury to find or not to find
intention in cases of indirect intent, the result of the Woollin direction is
that a question of law (the meaning of intention) will be decided as an
issue of fact. But the decision to give a jury such a discretion is right as
it enables any moral dilemma to be taken into account. If the House had
held that a jury must find intention in cases of indirect intent, where they
decide that the defendant foresaw a result as virtually certain and it was
objectively so, then consideration of any moral dilemma would be
excluded. Of course it may be that juries already consider these moral
dilemmas and would continue to do so despite such a direction-it is
difficult to know as research into the deliberations of juries is not
allowed. However it is 'virtually certain' that the result of a direction in
terms ofmust find would result in more murder convictions.52 From the
2 October 2000 'Convention rights' established by the European
Convention ofHuman Rights and its protocols (the Convention) become
part of domestic law in England and Wales" and courts are public
authorities which obliges them to act in accordance the Convention.
A defendant convicted of murder, by a court which did not allow
consideration of any moral dilemma, may argue that this breached his
convention right under Article 6--the right to a fair trial and thus have a
52
53
The writer once sat on a jury and the verdict was directly influenced by the direction of
law given by the judge.
Human Rights Act 1998 section I.
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ground for an appea1.54 So the House was right to allow consideration
of any moral dilemma in cases of indirect intent. One very important
consequence of this discretion, given to juries in cases of indirect intent,
is identified by Professor J C Smith:
'If the "moral threshold" test is to be applied to "oblique" intention
so as to save hard cases from conviction, why should it not also be
applied to direct intention, ie purpose? The typical mercy killer
acts with the purpose of killing -and his may be the hardest case
of al1.'55
The answer appears to be that, as a result of Convention rights,
any moral dilemma will have to considered in such cases, and thus mens
rea (certainly for result crimes) may have to be redefined to take motive
into consideration. Also the currently accepted draft definition of
intention56 is defmed in terms of must and may need to be redefined to
allow consideration of any moral dilemma.57 In Canada sections of the
Canadian Criminal Code have been set aside as incompatible with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.58 The Higher Courts in
England and Wales do not have the power to set aside legislation, but
they do have the power to make a declaration of incompatibility with the
Convention. 59 Thus any legislation containing the current draft definition
54
55
56
57
5X
59
Because by section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 a court is bound to act so as to
ensure compatibility with Convention rights.
Note 49 at p 43.
14( I) A person acts intentionally with respect to a result if -
(a) it is his purpose to cause it, or
(b) although it is not his purpose to cause it he knows that it would OCCur in the
ordinary course of events ifhe were to succeed in his purpose of causing some
other result.
Attached to Violence: Reforming the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (Home
Office, February 1998).
For example, in Martineau [1990] 2 S.C.R 633 s 213 (a) of the Canadian Criminal
Code (constructive murder) was set aside as violating section 7 (the right to a fair trail)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
n53 section 4.
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of intention may receive such a declaration. One possible result of the
coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 is that it may mean
that the time has come to accept that an assessment of moral guilt
depends on a consideration of all the circumstances and not only on the
presence or absence of a particular mental state such as foresight of a
risk.60
60
n58 at p 657 per L'Heureux-Dube J quoting Gordon GH, Subjective and Objective
Mens Rea, [1975] 17 CrimLQ 355, at 389-390.
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